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PEOPLE V. DURONCEI1AY

[48 C.2d

515 [279 P.
In re Wells, 35 Cal.2d 889, 895 [221
P.2d 947].)
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J ., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance.
While I unequivocally adhere to the salutary principles
stated in my dissenting opinion in Rogers v. Superior Court,
46 Cal.2d 3, 11 [291 P.2d 921], in view of the uncontradicted
evidence as disclosed by the record in this case that the confession which was obtained from defendant during a period
of illegal detention was freely and voluntarily given and that
no coercion was exerted on defendant by the prosecuting
officers, I am of the opinion that the admission of the confession did not constitute prejudicial error.

[Crim. No. 6008.

In Bank.

June 21, 1957.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. PAUL J. DURONCELAY,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Blood Tests-Consent.-A finding
that defendant consented to the taking of a sample of his
blood for an alcoholic test was unwarranted where the only
reasonable conclusion permitted by the testimony of an ambulance driver and the nurse who assisted him in taking the
blood sample was that, when asked for his permission, defendant made no verbal response to indicate whether he consented or refused and where, at the time the nurse approached
him with a needle, he reacted by withdrawing his arm.
[2] Witnesses-Self-incrimination.-The admission of evidence of
the results of a sample of blood taken from defendant does
not violate his privilege against self-incrimination, since the
privilege relates only to testimonial compulsion and uot to
real evidence.
[3a, 3b] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Due Process of Law.
-The taking of defendant's blood for an alcohol test, when
[2] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Witnesses,
§ 36 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 7] Criminal Law, § 417; [2] Witnesses,§ 19; [3] Criminal Law,§ 103; [4] Arrest,§ 12; [5] Criminal Law, § 1273; [6, 8] Searches and Seizures, § 1.
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[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

accomplished in a medically approved manner, does not constitute brutality or shock the
and hence does not
deny him due process of law.
Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause.-Where there
was reasonable cause to believe that, before a blood sample
was taken of defendant at the request of a highway patrolman,
defendant had committed the felony of which he was convicted,
he could have been lawfully arrested at that time. (Pen.
Code, § 836.)
Criminal Law-Appeal-Presumptions-Arrest.-Where there
is no claim that defendant was not arrested within a reasonable time or that the arrest was not made on the basis of the
facts known to the officer who investigated the accident in
question, a reviewing court must presume that there was a
lawful arrest in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where there are
reasonable grounds for an arrest, a reasonable search of a
person and the area under his control, to obtain evidence
against him, is justified as an incident to arrest, and the search
is not unlawful merely because it precedes, rather than follows, the arrest.
Criminal Law-Evidence-Blood Tests.-A sample of blood
taken from defendant for an alcohol test may serve to exonerate, as well as to convict.
Searches and Seizures-Reasonableness.-When the fact that
extraction of blood for testing purposes is an experience
which many undergo without hardship or ill effects, together
with the scientific reliability of such tests in establishing guilt
or innocence, is considered in the light of the imperative
public interest involved, the taking of a sample for such a
test without consent cannot be regarded as an unreasonable
search and seizure where the extraction is made in a medically
approved manner and is incident to the lawful arrest of one
who is reasonably believed to have violated Veh. Code, § 501,
relating to the offense of causing personal injury while driving
an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced
County and from an order denying a new trial. Gregory P.
Maushart, ,Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for causing personal lllJury while driving an
automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
[6] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.

168

PEOPI~E

v.

DUROXCEL\Y

Donald R
Edmund li. Brown, Ationll')" (Jpur:ral, Doris 11 :\Iaier and
,James 1\I.
Dcput,v
Cl('llP1'al, f'or He-

a jury of
C. J.-Defendaut \Yas ,,onvieted
se<·tion 501 of the Vehil'le Code ·whic·h provides tbat
one ·who drives an automobile 1vhile under the infinence of
liquor aud cause::; personal injury is
of a
felony
The aeeident happenetl at about 10 p. m. as defendant was
driYing his automobile in a westerly diredion on Yosemit<~
Ayenue in Merced County. A boulevard stop sign for westbound traffic was located at the interst~etion \Yhere Yos<~mite
AYeJme terminated, and, directly across the intersedion, there
\ras a "reflcetori7,ed" warning sign on the bank of m1 inigation ditch. Defendant's automobile went tlu·ough the intersection and collided with the bank of the ditch. knocking
down the warning sign. An eyewitness testitiell that the
automobile was "going pretty fast" and that then~ was no
illumination from its brake lights to indicate that the brakes
had been applied. There was also evidenee that there were
uo skid marks on the road.
Kenneth Riggs, who owned an ambulanc-e and held the
position of coroner, drove his vehicle to the seem~ of the a(~ci~
dent and found that defendant was uneonseious all(l that one
of two men riding with defendant wa:-; injured. 'rhe three
men ·were sitting in the front seat of the automobile, aud
ihc passenger farthest to the right had a wine bottle in
one hand and a ean of beer in the other. 'l'here \VCrc beer
eans on the floor of the automobile, and each of the men had
an odor of aleohol on his breath. A highway patrolman who
arrived at the seene before the ambulanee departed and who
eonducted an investigation noticed that there was an odor of
aleohol in the ear.
Defendant was taken to a hospital, and, after he regained
conseiommess, he vomited matter whieh had a strong snwll
of alcohol. Riggs, the ambulanee driYer, had been requested
by the highway patrol officer to obtain a sample of blood
from defendant to be used for all aleohol test, and he asked
defendant whether he eonsented to having the sample taken,
informing him that it would be used for such a test. Aecording
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to f{jggs, defendant, who was "quite siek at the time and
throwing up," did not give a uegative answet·, and, to the
best of his knowledge, Riggs reeeived an answer to take the
sample, although he eould not recall ''the exad words, or that
it aetuall.r was a .res." \Yhen a nurse approached with a
needle, defendant withdrew his arm, and Higgs held the arm
while she exteaded the blood. On cross-examination Riggs
was q nestiuned on tht• subjeet of defendant's l'Ol!Hf'Jlt aud
testified as follows:
Q. . . .L lwlieve you said that you did Hoi g<~t a negative
allsi\'t'l' awl you therefm·e w;stlllled that yon got au aftinnative
auswer, is that right 1
A. Yes, I think [did say it jHst about like that
I eau't
t·eeall. l.Le was not iu any eondition to ('Ollie oul and say,
··Yes, go ahead aud take a blood aleohol. '' Ht~ eouldn 't
say that mueh beeause he didn't say that many words all tht'
time he was iu the hospital. ...
Q. . . . would you assume therefore that he eonld answer
yes or no~
.A. Yes, with a little prodding he <~mtld, because it took
about 30 miuutes to get who he was and where he was
frol!l. . . .
Q. And I think that it is your testimony therefore that he
did not say yes, is that right 'I
A. No, I would say that he did not say no.
~. Well, eould you say that he did say yes "I
A . .L took it, and so 1 would say that he ::;aid yes, or I
wouldu 't have taken it. . . .
Q.... you did uot get an affirmative answer, is that t·ight "I
A. I still won't say that he said-if he said, "No," the blood
aleohol wouldn't have been taken.
Q. vVell, I understand that it is your position that ht•
didn't say no. Did he say yes?
A. \\Tell, I tell you, between the holding of the pau and the
bottle and his heaving, r can't tell that he said yes, but I
wonld say that he didn't say no.
The mtrse who extraeted the blood testified that, when de.
feJHlant was asked for his i·onsent, he gave rto answer.
'l'hr• blood sample takeu frollJ defmtdaut had au alcohol
<'otitt·ut of .22 Jwr· eeut. A <·.riminologist testified that every
one is umh•r the iuflut•n(~e of aleolwl when the aleohol eoHteut
in his blood l'nu·he:s .Hi pel' (•eut ami that, iu his opiniou,
llw fJt'!'sou fr·oru whom the sample was taken was uo longer
48 C.2d-25
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a motor n·h idt~ with his nonnal
of skill and judgmenL
[1] \Ve are of the opinion that the
reasonable conelusion permitted by the testimony of l{iggs and the nurse who
assisted him in
the blood
is that, when asked
for his
(1<-fendant made no verbal response to
indicate whether he t·onsented or refused. Because of defendant's
it would have been
diffieult
fo!' him to
an answer, but, ·when the nnrse approached
him with the needle, he reaeted by withdrawing his arm.
lTnder the eircumstmwes, a finding that defendant consented
is UJlWal'l'anted, and we mnst therefore determine whether tlw
results of the blood test were admissible in the absence of defendant's consent to the taking of the sample.
[2] It is settled by our decision in People v. Haeussler,
41 Cal.2d 252, 257 l260 P.2d 8], that the admission of the
evidence did not violate defendant's privilege against selfincrimination because the privilege relates only to testimonial
compulsion and not to real evidence. [3a] vVe also held in the
lhH'Ussler ease that the taking of the defendant's blood for an
alcohol test in a medically approved manner did not constitute brutality or shock the conscience and that, therefore,
the defendant had not been denied due process of law under
the rule applied in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72
S.Ct. 205, 96 hEd. 183, 25 A.hR.2d 1396]. This holding is
in accord with the recent decision of the United States
Supr·pme Conrt in Bn·ithaupt Y. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 [Ti
:-\.Ct. -!08, l L.Ed.2d .±48\, wlwre blood for an ah:ohol test was
taken by a doctor while the defendant was unconscjous. The
t:ourt pointed out that blood tests had become routiNe in everyday life and concluded that "a blood test taken by a skilled
t P<' h nil· ian is not sueh 'l:onduet that shoeks the conscience,'
Hoehin, supra (842 U.S. at 172), nor snch a method of obtaining evidence that it offends a 'sense of justice,' B1·own v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285, 286 [56 S.Ct. 461, 80 hE d.
U82]." 'l'here is no elaim in the present case that the blood
sample was not withdrawn in a medically approYed manner.
'l'he blood was extraeted by a registered nurse, and her testimony shows that she sterilized defendant's arm and used
sterilized instruments.
*It is clear from the record that the trial court clicl not admit the
results of the alcohol test on the basis of a finding that defendant had
eonsented to the blooll test but on the theory that, even if there was no
eonsent, the evidence was admissible under our dec.ision in People v.
Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 2G2 [260 P.2d 8].
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The qurstion remains as to whether the
of defend~
ant'>; blood eonstitutnd an unreasonable search and seizure in
Yiolation of his constitutional rights. vYe did not deciclc that
in
v. Haeussler, 41 CaL2d 252 [260 P.2d
,
because its determination 1vas not necessary in view
the rule
then followed itt this state that illegally obtained eYidenct>
was admissible. Nor was it decided in Breithaupt v. Abram.
:J;)2 FS. 4!~2 I Ti R.Ct. +OR, 1 LE(l.2d
, for the rrason
that Ne1r
1rhrre the jnrlgmrnt nnf!er revinw had been
permitte<l introduction of such evidenee. The que;;;~
1ion is now
bdorc us, however, since,
to
onr deeision m the Haeussler ease, we adopted the excJu.
rule m People v. Cahan, 44 CaL2d
445 f282
P.2d 905].
[4] It is obvious from the evidetwe that, brforc thr blood
sample was taken at the request of the highway patrolman,
thrrr was reasonable eanse to be1ieYe that defenrlant had com~
mitted the felony of which he. was convicted, and he could
ha,·e. b('Cn la1vfnlly arrested at that time. (Pen. Code, 836.)
[5] There is no claim that defendant was not arrested within
a reasonable time or that the arrest was not made on the basis
of the facts knmn1 to the offiecr who investigated the aecirlent,
am1 wr must presume that there was a lawful arrest, in the
absence of any showing to the contrary. (People v. Ji'armm.
4fi Ca L2d 265, 268-269 f294 P.2cl 21] ; People v. Beard, 46
C'al.2d 27R. 280 f204 P.2(l 29]: see Cone Civ. Pror., § J96~.
>;11 hds. 15, 33.)
[6] vVlwre tllere are rrasonable grounds for
an ann;t, a reasonable search of a prrson and the area under
hi:; eontrol to obtain rYidener against him is justified as a11
ineident 1o arrest. and tl1r srareh is not nnlawfnl merely br<'<ll!Rr it prr<·P<lrs, ra11H•r tlwn follows, thr anest. (People \'.
Simo11. +G Ca1.2d G4:J, fi4R-G4D [200 P.2d 5:111; T'rwplc Y.
Ro,1Jfrs, 4£i C'al.2<1 652, GG5 f2DO P.2d fi:15l; People v. Mat'fiu.
i3 Ca L2d 700, 762 f2:JO P .2<1 80fJl.l Fm1rr i hr einmmstanres.
a s<•areh. for example, of drfrndant 's pockets or his automobiJr to obtain additional rvidencc of the offense would havr
bern proper, regardless of wbetl1er he consented thereto. Tlw
question to be determined here is whether the taking of a
sample of his hloo<l for an aleolwl test \HlS a matter of such a
different eharaeter tllat it mnst be regarded as an unreasonablr sPareh and seizure.
[3b] As wr bavr sern, the extraction of defendant's blood
was a1·vomplislwd \Yith merlieal prrf'autions by a regisierrrl
nurse, and ii is seitlrcl that snrh r-ondntct is not brutal or
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shocking. Defendant does not challenge the accuracy of the
alcohol test, and it merits emphasis that, while the accounts
of eyewitnesses are often uncertain and conflicting on the
issue of intoxication, blood alcohol tests are so subject to
reliable scientific analysis that 23 states have enacted statutes
sanctioning the use of such tests. (See Breithaupt v. Abmm.
352 U.S. 432 l77 S.Ct. 408, 1 LEd.2d 448, M:il-452, fn. 3]. I
[7] Nor should it be ignored that a test of this kind may
serve to exonerate, as well as to convict.
The ineidence of death aml serious injury on the highways
has undeniably assumed tragic dimensions and has been due
in a significant degree to the effects of alcohol upon drivers.
(See National Safety Council Accident ~-,acts-1955, pp.
43-71.) So long as the measures adopted do not amount. to a
substantial invasion of individual rights, society must. not
be prevented from seeking to combat this hazard to the safety
of the public. [8] The extraction of blood for testing purposes is, of course, an experience which, every day, many
undergo without hardship or ill effects. \Vhen this fact, together with the scientific reliability of blood alcohol tests in
rstablishing guilt or innocence, is considrred in the light of
the imperative public interest involved, the taking of a
sample for such a test without consent cannot be regarded
as an nnreasonablr sParch and seizure where, as here, thr
t>xtraction is made in a medically approved manner and is
incident to the lawful arrest of one who is reasonably belirved
to haYe violated section 501 of the Vehiclr Code.
\Vt> conclude that there was no violation of defendant',
rights and that the rrsults of the alcohol test wrre properly
admitted in rvidence.
Thr jndgnwnt and tlw order denying a new trial are af~
firnwd.
Rhenk, .T., 'rra;vnor, ;r., Schaurr, ,J., Spt>IWP, .L, and
romb, ,J., concurred.

Mr~

CARTER J.-I dissent.
I am of the opinion that the taking of the blood sample
for a blood alcohol test in the absence of consent by defendant constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of his constitutional rights. I feel that the taking
of blood from defendant is a far different thing from thr
srarch of his car at the tinw of thr accident. Thr availablr
rviden('f' lrads to the inferen('e that rather than consenting,

,June 1957
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defendant tried to refuse to permit the blood sample to be
taken.
In People Y. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 2:52 [260 P.2d 8], in
which I dissented, the question of unreasonable search and
seizure was not decided. I wail of: the opinion there, as I
am here, that the taking of such a blood sample for the purpose of obtainiHg evidence to be used against the nonconsentiug person is both a deprivation of due process and an Ulleeasonable sean•h and seizure in violation of both the federal
and state Constitutions. 'l'he only justi:fieation for taking·
blood from a person who does not eoJJsent thereto is that
it is deemed neeessary by competPHt medical personnel iu
order to save the person's lifr. 'l'aking of a blood specimen
from a nmwonS('nting person to obtain evidence which may
be used against him is also a denial of thr privilrge against
~t' Jf-incrimination.
In Breithaupt v. Abram, :152 U.S. 4:32 177 S.Ct. 408, 1
t.~.Ed.2d 448], on which the majority relies hPre, Mr. ChiPf
.fustiee Warren dissented with Mr. Justice Blaek and Mr .
•Jnsti(~e Douglas comurring. Mr. Chief Justiee "Warren said:
'' 'l'hP judgnwnt in this <·ase shonld be n'Y<'rsrd if Rochin
,.. Caliform:a, 342 F.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 I1.Erl. 183, 25
A.IJ.R.2rl 1396], * is to retain its vitality and stand as more
than an instance of prrsonal revulsion against particular
police methods. I cannot agree with thP Court when it says,
'we see nothing t~omparablP here to thP fads in Hoehiu.' It
srems to me tht' essential elements of the eases arc the samr
and thP sauw result should follow.
'' 'l'lwre i~ much in the Court·~ opinion eoJwt•ruing tht>
hazards on our nation's highways, the rfforts of the Stat<'
to cnfm·t•e the traffie laws and the JJP(~essit,l' foJ' the m;e of
modern scientific methods in the detection of crinw. Evrrybody can agree with these sentiments, and yet they do not
h<•lp us particularly in detrrminiug whether this casP (•an
lw distinguished from Hoehin. 'rhat easr gTc>YI! ont of polil·P
l'fforts to curb the narcotics traffic, in which thPrc is surely
a state interest of at least as great magJJitude as the iuteres1
in highway law enforeement. Nor does the faet that many
*'!'hi~ rase originated in California. A majority of this court held
tl1at Rochiu 's constitutional rights had not Jwen invaded. Mr. Justice
Sdtaupr and I dissented from the denial of a pd.ition for hearing
(People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.App.2d 140, 143, 149 I :22;1 P.2d I, 913]).
'rhe United States Supreme Court reversed the District Court of Appeal
(Rochin v. CaUfornia, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 90 L.Ed, 183, 25
A.L.R.2d 1396]).

PEOl'LE U. DUROXCELAY

C.2d

States sanetion the use of blood test evidence differentiate
the east·~. "\ t the time Hoehin was deeided illegally obtained
evidence wa~ admissible in the vast
of States. In
both Hoc:hin awt thi~ ea~r the officers had probable cause to
the defendant of the offense of which
sought
PYidPJl('('. ll1 Hod1ill the dPfenrlant was known as a nareoti<:s
la>v
was arrested nnder
circumstances and
the officers to swallow narcotics. ln neither case,
of course, are we concerned with the defendant's guilt or
innoeenec·. 'l'he sole problem is whether the proceeding was
tainted
a violation of the defendant's eom;titutional rights.
'' ln n'al'hiHg ib eonclu:-;ion that in this <·asl'. nnlike I~()(~hin,
there is 11othing 'brutal' or 'offensive' the Conrt has not kept
~l"parate the component parts of the problem.
Essentially
there are two: the eharader of the invasion of the body and
the expres::>ion of the victim's will; the latter may be manifested by physieal resistance. Of course, one may eonsent to
having- his blood extracted or his stomach pumped and thereby
waiYe any due process objection. In that limited sense the
expression of the will is significant. But where there is no
affirmative consent, I eannot see that it should make any differenee whether one states unequivoeally that he objects or
resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such eondition
that he is unable to protest. 'l'he Court, howeYer, states that
'the absence of conscious consent, without more, doPs not
necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional
' This implies that a different result might follow if
petitioner has b('ell eonseious and had voice<1 his objeetion.
1
the distinction.
"Siuee there clearly was no eonsent to the blood
it is
the nature of the invasion of the body tlmt should be determinative of the due proeess question here presented. 'l'he
Court opinion suggests that an invasion is 'brutal' or 'offensive' only if the police use force to overcome a suspeet 's
rP;;istam:e. By its I'<'l'ital of tlw faets in Roehin-the reft>renees to a 'considerable struggle' and the fact that the stomach
pump was 'fordbly used '*-the Court finds Hoehin distinguishable from this ease. I cannot aeeept an analysis that
would make physical resistanee by a prisoner a prerequisite
to the existence of his constitutional rights.
"Apart from the irrelevant factor of physical resistancP,
*Actually, the strugg·Je in Hochin oceurred in the rlefendaut 's lJOme
after the officers had lnoken in. He was arreste<l and taken to a lJOS·
pital, and there was no evidence that he struggled there.
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tlw
nsrd in this ease and in Hochin an~
J n rach the
was
a doctor in a
In each there was an extraetion of body fluids.
Neither
normally eansps any
ill effects. The
Court denominates a blood test as a scientific method for de~
crime and cites the
of such tests in our
life. The stomach pump too is a common and acway of making tests and relieving distress. But it
does not follow from the fact that a technique is a product
of science or is in common, consensual use for other purposes
that it can be used to extract evidence from a criminal defendant without his consent. \Vould the taking of spinal
fluid from an unconscious person be eoncloned because snch
tests are commonly made and might be used as a scicntifie
aid to law enforcement 7
"Only personal reaction to the stomach pump and the
blood test can distinguish them. To base the restriction
which the Due Process Clause imposes on state criminal procedures upon such reactions is to build on shifting sands.
'\Ve should, in my opinion, hold that clue proeess means at least
that law-enforcement officers in their efforts to obtain evidence from persons suspected of crime must stop short of
bruising the body, breaking skin, puncturing tissue or extracting body fluids, whether they contemplate doing it by
force or by stealth."
Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. ,Justice Black joined,
wrote, in addition, a separate dissenting opinion in which
he said:
"The Court seems to sanction in the name of law enforcement the assault made by the police on this unconscious man.
ff law Pnforcement were the chief value in our ronstitutional
seheme, then due process woulcl shrivel and become of littlr
Yalue in proteeting the rights of the eitizen. But thosE' who
fashioned the Constitution put certain rights out of the reaeh
of the police and preferred other rights over law enforcement.
''One source of proteetion of the eitizen against state action
is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Our deeisions hold that the police violate due process when
they use brutal methods to obtain evidenee against a man
and use it to eonvict him. Rochin v. California, 342 1T.S. 165
[72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 18:-.1, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396] ; Chambers v.
Ji'lorid.a, 309 U.S. 227 [60 S.CL 472, 84 I1.Ed. 716]. Rut
the eoneeption of dne proeess is not limited to a prohibition
of the use of force and violence
an aeeused. ln

77n
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847 P.S. 55G [74 S.Ct. 71G, fiR lJ.Ed. fl4Rj.

wr 1lrt aside a conviction where subtle, nonviolent methods had
heen used to l'Xaet a confession from a prisoner. ]<'or it ;,va"
obvious that eoercion might be the produet of subtlrty as wrll
as of violcnee. \V r should take the same libertarian approarh
hrrt>.
"As I nndt>rstand today's decision thprc would he a Yiola.
tion of due proers:; if the blood had 1Jf'f'l1 witlH1rawn from tht>
aecnsed after a struggle with the police. But the sanctit:·
of the person is equally violated and his body assaulted when'
the prisoner is incapable of offering resistance as it would be
if force were used to overcome his resistance. In both cases
evidence is used to convict a man which has been obtained
from him on an involuntary basis. I would not dra\Y a linr
between the use of force on the one hand and trickery, subterfuge, or any police technique which takes advantage of
the inability of the prisoner to resist on the other. Nor would
I draw a line between involuntary extraction of words from
his lips, the involuntary extraction of the eontents of his
stomach, and the involuntary extraetion of fluids of his body
when the evidence obtained is used to convict him. Under
our system of government, police cannot compel people to
furnish the evidence necessary to send them to prison. Yet
there is compulsion here, following the violation by the poliee
of the sanctity of the body of an unconscious man.
''And if the decencies of a civilized state are the test,
it is repulsive to me for the police to insert needles into an
unconscious person in order to get the evidence necessary to
convict him, whether they find the person unconscious, give
him a pill which puts him to sleep, or use force to subdue
him. The indignity to the individual is the same in one case
as in the other, for in each is his body invaded and assaulted
by the poliee who are supposed to be the citizen's proteetor. ''
The views expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
,Justice Douglas are particularly applicable to the case at
bar. Here we do not have an unconscious person but one
who, with the only strength he had, tried to refuse to have
the blood test taken. A majority of this court is of the
opinion, however, that since the blood sample was taken with
all medical preeautions the eonduct of the law enforcement
offieers was neither brntal nor shocking and. as in the Breithaupt ease. beeansr bloofl teRts arr evrryda:- oerurrenees
which are undergone by persons consenting thereto for one
reason or another, there is nothing wrong with a blood test
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taken from one who either does not consent or is incapable
of
b is wishes known. [ do not agree and the time
will come when this eourt will be forced by the Supreme
Court of the United States to revamp its theories on this
as it has been forced to do in the past in other instances.
v.
342 U.S. Hi5 [72 S.Ct. 205,
96 hEd.
25 A.L.R.2d 1396]
r appears to me that this case illustrates the whittlingdown process which a
of this court has engaged
in sim~e the Cahan case was deeidt•d. (People v. Cahan, 44
CaL2d
445 j282 P.2d 905).
Prior 1o the Cahan case
I had
advoeatPd the inadmissibility of evidence illegally
obtaiut>.d, and
a majority of this court saw fit to adopt
the view that evidence so obtained was not admissible. However,
its holdiug here that evidence obtained by foree
from a nmwonseuting person was not unlawfully obtained,
the salutary rule of the Cahan case is evaded.
As I said in my dissenting opinion in People v. Haeussler,
41 Cal.2d 252, 268, 2()5 !260 P.2d 8), "Because I believe in
the dignity and security of the individual and agree with the
framers of the Bill of Hights that 'the right of the people to
be secure in their TJersons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searehes aud seizures,' should 'not be violated,'
(emphasis added). I (:an not sanf'tion the eowluet of the
officers in this rase, and would, therefore, reVt~rse the judgment.''
li'or the foregoing reasous I wonld reverse the judgment

